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ABSTRACT
During the rapid growth of the U.S. Airline industry
in the 1960's, capital budgeting for new equipment was primar-
ily influenced by rapidly rising demand and the desire to re-
place obsolete propeller aircraft. In a mature airline with
lower growth rates, replacement becomes a significant factor
in capital budgeting. When combined with the distorted age
distribution imposed by historic actions and inflation, low
growth provides a setting in which capital budgeting patterns
can have significant inpact on earnings and cash flow.
Through the use of an analytical computer model, the
impact of various capital budgeting strategies were examined.
This analysis led to four primary conclusions. First,
with historical cost accounting and inflation, cyclic invest-
ment leads to cyclic earnings. Earnings would be substanti-
ally smoothed by adopting a smooth investment policy. Second,
a cyclic investment pattern produces large fluctuations in
cash flow. This produces financial problems in investing cash
during inflows and producing cash during outflows. Third,
discounted cash flow (DCF) must be examined as a function of
time to be meaningful when evaluating investment patterns.
Fourth, use of an indicator such as real investment per unit
traffic is useful in smoothing investment and therefore
earnings and cash flow.
Thesis Supervisor: E. Eugene Carter
Title: Visiting Associate Professor
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Airline industry over the last twenty
years has experienced growth and technological change at
rates and at a scale duplicated in few, if any, other indus-
tries. In the period from 1963 to 1969, the industry grew
at a compound rate of 19.9% (as measured by revenue ton
miles) .l The domestic trunk airlines went from virtually all
piston powered airplanes to jets, in the decade from 1959 to
1969, achieving dramatic increases in productivity. In the
three year period from 1966 through 1968, the U.S. trunks
ordered 7.3 billion dollars2 of new flight equipment or, in
other terms, an amount equal to their combined 1968 net worth
of 2.4 billion dollars each year!
However, the U.S. Airline industry faces a differ-
ent situation today. The four years from 1969 to 1973 showed
a compound growth rate of only 4.21. Technological innova-
tion, while still significant, does not promise any radical
change in productivity for the near future. The SST, once
heralded as the next major step, seems to have fallen as a
result of economic and political considerations.
1Air Transport 1974 Facts And Figures, Air Transport Asso-
ciation of America, Washington D.C.
2Ibid.
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Whether the U.S. Airline industry has reached that
magical point at which it can be called mature is debatable.
However, at some point in time, growth rates must drop from
the super-normal levels to ones more in line with the growth
in GNP and/or population. Whether maturity was reached in
1970, or the current drop in growth is only temporary,
maturity will come to the U.S. airlines, and probably sooner
rather than later. If the current situation is assumed to
reflect maturity, then strategies for the future can be exam-
ined in this setting. If growth resumes, the study should
still be valuable as an aid in examining that inevitable
future maturity.
This study is intended to examine one aspect of the
situation in a maturing airline industry: capital budgeting
patterns for future expenditures. It is not intended to
examine cost trends, fleet planning, competitive strategies,
regualtory actions or any of the other problems which form
the total environment in which the airlines must make deci-
sions. By focusing on the single issue of capital budgeting
as influenced by financial considerations, it is hoped that
some light will be shed on this critical segment. When com-
bined with all of the other factors, careful capital budgeting
should help considerably in the difficult transition from a
growth-dominated industry to a mature one.
In order to examine the financial aspects of capital
-9-
budgeting, I have developed a model of a hypothetical airline
rather than attempting to exactly duplicate all aspects of
any one airline. I have relied extensively on data from three
U.S. trunk airlines to develop the underlying base from which
to start. Data from these airlines have also been used to
illustrate certain concepts or situations.
Hypothesis
It is my hypothesis that the pattern of capital
spending in a low growth airline can adversely affect its
financial performance. In particular, if a cyclic pattern is
imposed on capital spending, it will be reflected in a cyclic
variation in reported earnings. Thus, it is possible for an
airline, while attempting to minimize the impact of the econ-
omic cycle, to generate cyclic performance simply through
uneven capital budgeting. There are several factors which
make the current airline situation critical.
First, if the low growth rates continue, replacement
decisions become much more important. At zero growth rate,
the airlines face the replacement of better than two thirds of
their asset base in the next decade. By contrast, if the
growth rate were 20%, the investment for replacement would be
an insignificant 10% of total investment by an airline 13
times larger than today. Thus, replacement of the 1966-1968
investment will be much more significant in a low growth air-
-10-
line than in one experiencing rapid growth.
Second, the large capital expenditures of 1966-1968
and low current expenditures have imposed a significant dis-
tortion on the fleet structure. In some cases, better than
half the fleet dates from that three year period. As the
1966-1968 investment ages, the depreciation tax shield will be
lost (1975 or 1976) requiring increased cash outflows. Then
in the early 1980's the 1966-1968 investment must be replaced.
Unless special steps are taken, a new investment peak will be
generated and a cyclic investment pattern established.
The final factor is inflation. Normally, the impact
of a cyclic investment pattern on earnings is smoothed by the
relatively long depreciation period. However, since inflation
changes the value of money with time and depreciation (under
current accounting practice) reflects only historical costs,
uneven investment and inflation result in an uneven depre-
ciation charge. Thus, a cyclic investment during an infla-
tionary period is reflected through depreciation to produce
cyclic earnings.
Conclusions
The analysis presented here leads to some general
conclusions regarding the pattern of capital budgeting in a
low growth airline.
1. With historic cost accounting and inflation,
-11-
cyclic investment will produce cyclic reported
earnings. The greater the inflation rate,
the greater the amplitude of the fluctuations.
2. Cyclic investment produces cyclic cash flows
which place a significant strain on the finan-
cial capability of an airline. In periods of
high cash inflow, investments must be made
which are both hedged against inflation and
liquid enough to provide the cash source for
the next capital equipment cycle.
3. Discounted cash flow (DCF) must be examined
as a function of time when evaluating competing
capital budgeting patterns. This is particu-
larly important when evaluating cyclic invest-
ment patterns since the DCF is high just after
a major investment and low just before.
4. One indicator of investment performance is
the constant dollar book value per revenue ton
mile. If this measure of real investment per
unit traffic is relatively smooth then the
distortion of reported earnings as a result
of the investment pattern should be minimized.
-12-
CHAPTER II
CRITICAL FACTORS
It is the purpose of this study to concentrate on
the impact which capital investment patterns have on the
financial performance of an airline. This is intentionally
a narrow view and is aimed at understanding a critical segment
of the total airline performance. I have not included cost
trends, competitive strategies, or regualtory actions, all
of which can have dramatic financial impact on an airline.
Issues more closely related to capital budgeting such as fleet
mix and standardization have not been included primarily
because the added complexity would not add to the understand-
ing of the basic issue.3  The analysis has been structured so
that if profits or cash flows vary, the variation can be
attributed to the investment policy rather than to some
assumption in the relationship between operating costs and
revenues.
In analyzing the current airline situation, I have
chosen to concentrate on three U.S. trunk airlines as opposed
to the industry in an aggregated form. This was done to allow
the examination of different situations which otherwise would
3All of the above items and many additional factors clearly
must be included in any comprehensive airline capital
budgeting decision.
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be lost in the aggregation process. The three airlines con-
sidered were; United Airlines, American Airlines and Delta
Airlines.
United was chosen as being most typical of the
industry generilly. It is the largest domestic airline and
has a route structure which covers essentially the entire
country. American provides an intermediate base point in
the airline industry. It has typically pursued an aggressive
policy toward the acquisition of new flight equipment. Delta
provides an industry contrast to United and American. Delta
has consistently been more profitable than the industry aver-
age and, although only 58% the size of United, (based on total
revenue) earned an airline industry record profit in calendar
1974.
In examining these three airlines, I have inten-
tionally used published data.4  While this may result in
slightly less accuracy (particularly in the tax area), I feel
that it allows a free discussion of the results without
concern about the use of proprietary data.
Three factors appear to be critical in determining
the impact of capital budgeting patterns on financial per-
formance:
4All data shown for the individual airlines was derived from
annual reports from 1958 to 1974.
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1. Growth rate
2. Historical actions
3. Inflation
This chapter discusses each of these three factors
in some detail in order to provide the basis and starting
point for the analysis of future capital budgeting patterns.
Growth Rate
Airline traffic has grown rapidly since the mid
1920's almost without a pause. (Growth did stop during the
post World War II years but then resumed its rapid rise.)
Figure II-1 shows the classic growth cycle of several indus-
tries including the U.S. airlines.5  The semi-log format
points up the typical turn from a growth industry to a mature
industry. It is almost impossible today to tell whether that
turn has been reached for the airline industry.
Figure 11-2 shows the more recent traffic data and
growth rates.6 While the sharp decline in growth rate may
only be a temporary event, there are indications of maturity.
Figure 11-3 shows the yield (effective price) for the U.S.
5Munson, H. Carl, Commercial Aircraft Marketing: A
Manufacturing View, 23rd Air Transport Course, Oxford
University, October, 1974.
6Air Transport 1974 Facts and Figures, Air Transport
Association of America, Wahington D.C.
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trunk airlines in real terms.7  The shift from decreasing unit
price to a more stable situation is also typical of the matur-
ing process. However, while there are a number of signs
which indicate that the U.S. airline industry is reaching a
mature state, the answer is not critical to this analysis. It
may safely be assumed that the industry will mature at some
point and that the assumption of maturity used here will be
valid at that time.
Growth, by its very nature, tends to focus invest-
ment decisions on meeting the needs of tomorrow. Figure 11-4
indicates the proportion of total investment which is required
to replace old equipment. If growth rates near 20% are main-
tained and airplanes last between 14 and 21 years, only 3%
to 7% of the investment goes to replacing used airplanes. It
is clear that numbers of this order can be rather easily
absorbed into the more serious decision as to whether it is
possible to finance the growth requirement.
If, on the other hand, growth rates fall to the 4%
growth rate typical of GNP, nearly 60% of the total investment
is for replacement (assuming a 14 year life). As an obvious
end point, if popultion growth falls from the historical 2%
toward 0%, airline growth rates could easily fall to where
better than 90% of the investment is for replacement.
Ibid.
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It is worth noting that historically, technical
innovation has been a major factor in investment strategy.
For example, there was a very significant increase in unit
productivity with the introduction of the jet powered air-
plane. The direct operating costs dropped sharply and so the
financial decision to invest was not too difficult. This
was aided by a supporting marketing decision which made the
replacement of old propeller airplanes almost mandatory.
The future of technical innovation is far less
clear. To say that all the inventions have been made would be
folly. However, it would be equally absurd 'to assume that
past operating cost improvements may be extrapulated into the
future. While jet engines appeared in the mid 1940's, they
were not incorporated on commercial aircraft for nearly 15
years. There are no similar breakthroughs evident today and
it may be a reasonable. and conservative assumption to examine
the airline industry without the benefit of further major
technical innovation.
Historical Actions
The makeup of an airline fleet reflects past invest-
ment patterns and also has considerable impact on what future
investment patterns will be. Figure 11-5 presents the theo-
retical fleet age distribution for an airline where investment
was governed solely by growth. As would be expected, the more
I0
do I
740rr
TernA XE eor
0
0
FLEcr AGE DisrvorvrlOM
F*I
0
EFFtcr or Gfasrq AAVE
/4 YVaa A'gnAn tir
Ce)
A f
r. 10
AfE ~ YEA45
Is-
to
Ar
10
oe dw
7W7AL Feu"r
0
0
EE" ccrOr AIMPLAMS LireI
IFe. 6*evrN iATE
(b)
4IRPLANS LIFE YWARS
7
Ald
10
AGE a YEAAJ
FeVtt it ~5
-21-
to
to
- I I
I
I
-22-
rapid the growth rate, the more the age distribution is skewed
to the low end. The same data can be shown (Figure 11-6)
in terms of average age of the fleet. Again, as the growth
rate increases, the average age declines and, as the life
is increased, for a given growth rate, the average age
increases.
The above distributions assume a steady state growth
rate and constant airplane life. The next step is to assume
that the actual fleet will be the result of variable growth
rates and specific fleet replacement decisions. An exami-
nation of the United Airlines fleet and the significant fac-
tors which produced it, helps to illustrate this concept. The
fleet age distribution for United Airlines is shown in Figure
11-7 (a) and the average age in Figure 11-7 (b). At first
examination the United distribution is somewhat surprising
with respect to the tremendous concentration from 4.5 through
7.5 years old. Almost 2/3 of the total fleet is contained
in that 4 year span. There are several factors which produce
this distribution. The most significant factor in producing
the fleet structure is the period of rapid growth followed by
low growth. Figure Il-8 (a) compares the age distribution
with one derived by assuming that investment exactly matched
actual experienced growth. While the 'fit is reasonable, there
are still areas which need to be explained.
A second factor is found in the types of airplanes
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purchased. The last few years have seen the introduction of
the "wide body" airplanes with their great capacity. Purchas-
ing was not evenly spread through all sizes of airplanes and
thus a fleet age distribution would tend to empasize the
earlier purchases of smaller airplanes. Figure 11-8 (b) com-
pares the age distribution of seats to that predicted by
growth. As expected, recent years are increased in signifi-
cance, but the four year period (4.5 through 7.5 years old)
still contains more than half the total seats available.
Finally, United made two decisions which impact this
distribution; to become "all-jet" in 1968 and, to retain the
older DC-8-20/30 while retiring the 720 in 1973. When these
two items are included, the match becomes quite good (Figure
II-8(c)). In sumnary, it appears that the United fleet age
distribution is primarily the result of meeting growth
requirements. Modifications to that basic distribution are
the result of specialized replacement decisions, the most sig-
nificant of which was the decision to go "all jet".
Inflation
The impact of inflation on financial performance
is related to the mechanics of accounting rather than to a
more formal causal relationship. Inflation has its most
dramatic impact on earnings through depreciation.
With no inflation, depreciation will mask the effect
-27-
of a cyclic investment pattern as long as the period of the
investment cycle is less than the depreciation period. In
other words, depreciation reflects the mean investment over
the depreciation period. However, the situation changes with
the addition of inflation. As illustrated in Figure 11-9,
inflation not only contributes to a rising current dollar
investment and depreciation, but also causes the cyclic
investment to be reflected in cyclic depreciation.
The impact of inflation on depreciation is very
important when the effect on earnings is considered. Depre-
ciation is typically a very large fraction of gross earnings
from operations (before depreciation, interest, and taxes).
Thus, fluctuations of 20% as shown in the example can easily
mean the difference between a significant profit and a loss.
The factors of growth, historical action and infla-
tion are important individually, but when taken together are
critical to airline financial performance. At high growth
rates, the investment pattern is not really an option since
new equipment decisions are dominated by meeting new demand.
At low growth, the pattern of capital budgeting comes under
the control of managment.
If the age distribution of an airline fleet were
marked by uniformity, the impetus towards a cyclic investment
pattern would be minimal. However, the varied growth rates
and major technological innovations of the last two decades
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have produced airline fleets with significant distortions.
Combined with a low growth environment, there is a strong
tendency to repeat past investment patterns when replacing
aging equipment. This can easily result in a cyclic capital
budgeting pattern.
Finally, without inflation, depreciation does much to
smooth the variations in investment. With historic cost
accounting and inflation, fluctuations in investment are
reflected in depreciation charges. Thus, the combination of
low growth, historically based fleets with uneven age distri-
butions and inflation set the stage for a discussion of the
impact of capital budgeting patterns.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS METHODS
The evaluation of various investment strategies
presents a difficult problem. It would be desirable to have a
single measure by which to judge the merit of any given strat-
egy. However, as might be expected, a single measure inevit-
ably results in a narrow view and overlooks other key factors.
This chapter presents the various evaluation measures used.
The other key element of the analysis is a repre-
sentation of the fianacial characteristics of airline capital
budgeting. A computer model was developed to allow many
investment patterns and parameter sensitivities to be explo-
red. This model is not and cannot be a crystal ball for
predicting the future. It does provide a valuable analytical
tool and, as such, is presented and validated in this chapter.
The computer program is presented in Appendix A.
Indicators
The evaluation of financial performance makes use
of a number of indicators and financial measures. As pres-
ented earlier, the age and age distribution of an airline
fleet indicate a great deal about past growth and investment
strategy. However, even using an age distribution of avail-
able seats lacks considerably in relating to financial per-
-31-
formance. A more meaningful measure would be the real invest-
ment relative to some indicator of traffic. After trying
several combinations, the most useful appears to be the real
(constant dollar) book value per revenue ton mile (RTM).
Using RTM as a normalizing factor allows comparisons between
airlines of different sizes and passenger/cargo mix. It is
difficult to get a good constant dollar book value, but a
reasonable approximation may be obtained by adjusting the
current book value by the consumer price index (CPI).8
As shown in Figure III-1, the constant dollar net
book value per RTM (CNBV/RTM) for United and American has
an investment peak in the late sixties when the tremendous
purchases referred to earlier occurred. However, a more
important feature of the data is the current trend. Both
United and American show a rapidly falling CNBV/RTM. This
implies a depletion of the asset base with the further impli-
cation of future investment if the asset base is to be
restored. Delta, on the other hand, has exhibited a much
smoother (and lower) CNBV/RTM and particularly, has avoided
a rapidly falling value as the low growth period began in
1969.
Another indicator of the airline financial
In addition to the net book value for flight equipment shown
in annual report data, the estimated book value of leased
aircraft was added so that the entire fleet was represented.
-32-
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performance is the financial structure itself. The capital
structure of the airlines is made up of three significant
parts; interest-bearing long-term debt, deferred taxes, and
equity.
Within the interest-bearing long-term debt are major
subdivisions; long-term debt and lease debt. As the airlines
debt escalated in the mid-sixties, they were unable to take
full advantage of the investment tax credit (ITC) and so a
number of financial; leases were made with banks and insur-
ance companies who had the profits to use the ITC.
The deferred taxes are a very important segment of
debt since they represent a zero interest loan from the U.S.
government. The airlines tend to write off new equipment
using accelerated depreciation and short time periods (usually
7-8 years) for tax purposes but using straight line depre-
ciation and long periods (usually 14-16 years) for financial
accounting. This dramatically reduces actual taxes and
results in a deferred tax in the financial books.9
Finally, in the equity area, I have included common
It should be noted that the airline must be profitable in
the tax books in order to achieve the full amount of
deferred tax. This is true since there cannot be negative
real taxes while there can be negative taxes in financial
accounting. The use of tax loss carryforward (backward)
does allow the depreciation to be spread over a longer
period but doesn't allow the generation of as mudh deferred
tax "debt".
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stock, retained earnings and preferred stock. Figure 111-2
compares the capital structure of the three airlines and-Table
III-1 gives more of the detailed information. The capital
structure of United and American are very similar while
Delta's shows some marked differences:
* United and American have about one quarter
of invested capital from equity with Delta
10% higher.
e Approximately two thirds of the United/
American capital comes from debt with Delta
20% lower.
* Delta has 20% of its capital from deferred
credits while United and American have about
10% from this source.
The differences would be even more significant if
market values were used for stock issues. Neither United nor
American would change much (less than 3%), but Delta would
move to 61% equity, 28% debt and 11% deferred credit.
The analysis presented here uses three financial
measurements; earnings, cash flow, and discounted cash flow.
Each of these measures is important to the total evaluation.
Reported earnings have been the standard measure in industry
and thus represent an important criteria. Management is
usually judged and compensated based on short term.earnings.
Cash flow is used as a measurement tool since it
reflects the most basic consideration in continued operation
-35-
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CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Table III-1
Conon Stock
Retained Earnings
Preferred Stock
Total Equity
UNITED*
$M -%
444.6 15.9
242.3 8.7
27.0 1.0
713.9 25.6
AMERICAN* DEL
$m- % $m
345.1 16.2 139.7
196.2 9.2 304.2
541.3
-.
25.4 443.9
TA*
11.2
24.4
35.6
Long Term Debt
Leases (aircraft)
Leases (other)
Total Debt
Deferred Credit 297.7 10.6 181.5 8.5 229.6 18.4
2795.8 100 2129.9 100 1246.2 100
* Data as of December 1973 except Delta as of June 1974
969.0
481.7
333.5
1784.2
34.7
17.2
11.9
63.8
587.4
503.0
316.7
1407.1
27.6
23.6
14.9
66.1
345.1
55.4
172.2
572.7
27.7
4.4
13.8
45.9
Total
I
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of the airline. In this case, net cash flow is used and
includes all cash transactions with the exception of dividend
payments.
Finally, discounted cash flow (DCF) is used as an
evaluation of various strategies consistant with the concept
of the time value of money. With other things equal, it is
better to have the cash now rather than later. The DCF data
is presented as the net present value (NPV) of future cash
flows and will be shown as a function of the discount rate
rather than depending upon a single measure such as internal
rate of return or NPV at a fixed discount rate.
The Evaluation Model
As with any model which is used to represent the
structural situation of an economy, industry or corporation,
trades must be made between complexity and accuracy. The more
complex the model, the better (should be) the fidelity of
representation. However, against the fidelity must be placed
the ability to interpret the results and the time required
for implementation. A highly complex, multi-loop model with
a large number of variables may well serve to confuse where
it was intended to enlighted. I have chosen to make a number
of assumptions which allow an examination of the financial
variables in some detail but essentially eliminate operating
and marketing variables.
-38-
The model starts by projecting future revenues ton
miles (RTM) based on an input growth rate. Growth rate may
be varied on a yearly basis if desired. A basic assumption
is made that a real investment of $1 will produce one RTM.
This assumes that all airplanes are equally productive per
dollar invested in real terms. While this assumption does not
allow a type-by-type analysis, it does serve the purpose of
examining capital budgeting patterns. Figure 111-3 indicates
the real investment per RTM for United Air Lines estimated
in 1973 dollars.
The model then compares input annual investment with
gross real investment required to meet the growth demand. Any
excess investment is eliminated by selling off the oldest
airplanes (for economic value) .lO From the real investment,
actual investment is determined based on the input inflation
rate. From the aray of actual investments, two depreciation
values are calculated. For tax purposes, flight equipment is
depreciated using double declining balance (DDB) and a seven
year life. Straight line depreciation is used for the last
three years to bring the residual value to zero. For
financial accounting, flight equipment is depreciated using
10The model assumes an initial investment which is distributed
over time so as to satisfy the conditions that no airplane
is over 14 years old and that investments were made in
relation to input historical growth rate.
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straight line (SL) to zero and a fourteen year life. For
simplicity, it is assumed that all equipment is acquired at
mid year so that half of the calculated depreciation is taken
in the initial and final years. Figure 111-4 compares the
two depreciation schedules for a $1 investment.
The taxes are computed both for tax purposes and for
financial reporting. An investment tax credit (ITC) of 7%
is assumed and is distributed over a seven year period in
proportion to the DDB depreciation. It is assumed that ITC
is used up to a limit of one half the tax and no expiration
is assumed. For tax purposes, a negative tax is not allowed,
giving rise to a tax loss carryforward for years in which
losses are computed. No expiration is assumed and no read-
justment of previous years is attempted. While this treat-
ment of taxes is not exact, it represents the basic elements
and the additional complexity required to represent further
detail was not felt to be worth-while.
Long term debt is computed based on the cash needed
for net purchases which are not covered by cash generated by
operations after payment of taxes, interest, and dividends.
Dividends are assumed to be half of earnings when profitable
and zero in loss years. Interest is charged at 9% on debt
and earned at 7% on negative debt (outside investments of
excess cash.)
Cash from operations is basically determined as an
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operating margin on revenue ton miles. Figure 111-5 com-
pares the operating margin used with that of the industry and
American Airlines. Because of lease commitments which are
reported as operating expenses but have implicit interest
charges, it is estimated that about lQ/RTM should be added
to the data shown. A graduated penalty is assessed for all
airplanes over 14 years old in the fleet. This results in a
cash margin which declines linearly to zero at 22 years.
The reduction in cash flow is only an estimate of higher
maintenance and modernization costs for older airplanes. The
niodel output does not appear to be particularly sensitive to
this assumption but it was felt to add some realism.
Any model should pass two basic tests; rationality
and predictive capability. The relatively simple model used
in this study is predicated on the assumptions laid out in
the initial part of this section. Whether they meet a test
of rationality may be judged by the reader.
The predictive quality of any model is always sub-
ject to debate. Almost by definition, it will only predict
what has been anticipated and thus included in the model.
For example, this model may predict cash flows in a stable
economy with reasonable accuracy but will not predict profit-
ability in the event of fuel cost increases. The model used
here is intended to examine only the financial performance
of an airline with differing investment strategies.
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With the above caveat, it is worthwhile to validate
the results produced by examining the first 8 years run on
the model. This period is intended to generally duplicate the
investment strategy of United and American Airlines through
the period of 1966 to 1974. It is typified by a period of
sustained 15% growth with excess investment in model years
2 and 3, (model year 0 corresponds roughly to 1966). Growth
rate and investment fall to zero in year 5.
Figure 111-6 compares the constant dollar net book
value (CNBV) per RTM of United and American with that of the
model. The correlation indicates that the investment/growth
relationships are similar. Figure III-7(a) and 7(b) compare
the age distributions and average age and again the correla-
tion is reasonable. Figure 111-8 shows the capital structure
of the model. While full data (present value of lease commit-
ments) are not readily available over the full period, the
capital structure data shown in Figure 111-9 indicates the
same structure and trends. Up to this point, the correlation
is essentially "mechanical", i.e. by adjusting the inputs it
should be possible to exactly reproduce the airline situation.
It is important because it sets a realistic stage for the
evaluation of future strategies.
It is also valuable to examine return on net worth
and ROI. Since many of the operating factors which affect
return are not considered, a satisfactory comparison of trends
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should be sufficient to proceed. Figure III-10(a) and (b)
indicate a definite correlation with the declining return,
losses and then initial recovery experienced by United and
American. It should be noted that earnings data (including
the model) were smoothed by application of a 3 year moving
average to surpress some of the short term operating effects.
At the end of year eight, the model presents a
simplified representation of the airlines financial situation
and fleet structure at the end of 1974. Run forward, it
should produce pro-forma financial data by which various
investment strategies can be evaluated.
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CHAPTER IV
STRATEGY ANALYSIS
In considering alternative strategies, it is most
helpful to start with the apparent options, examine the
general implications of those options and then build to other
varients. There are an infinite number of possible combina-
tions of growth rate, historical fleet structure, and infla-
tion rate which can be analyzed. For clarity, I have chosen
to look at the impact of capital budgeting patterns for an
initial growth rate of 15% which drops to zero. The histor-
ical fleet structure used will be comparable to the current
United and American Airlines fleets. Inflation will be
initially at 5% with runs to check the sensitivity over the
range of 0% to 10%.
Three possible strategy options for the no-growth
case are as follows:
1. Do-nothing - This strategy is possible since
new airplanes are not required to satisfy
a growth requirement.
2. Replace airplanes at a fixed age - This strategy
is the natural outgrowth of the assumption
that capital equipment has some reasonable
well defined life. The financial book life of
14 years is used for replacement, but the results
-52-
are similar for any fixed age.
3. Replace airplanes so that investment is at a
constant rate - This strategy implies that
replacement investment is made such that a
steady turnover is achieved in a fixed time
period. Again, 14 years is used but is not
critical to the results.
The first step will be to look at the effect that
these three options have on a simplified fleet structure.
This should indicate the general characteristics of the
options. The analytical model will then be used to examine
the financial implications of the options with the more typ-
ical fleet structure and inflation.
Figure IV-1 illustrates the three potential fleet
age distributions which result from the different investment
patterns. The age distributions are shown five years after
a transition from a growth rate of 15% to one of 0%. Figure
IV-l(a) shows the "do-nothing" case where the net result is
that the age distribution achieved during the period of growth
ages uniformly and moves steadily to the right. The fined
age replacement case (Figure IV-l(b)) produces an age distri-
bution which repeats itself as the 14 year old airplanes are
replaced one for one by new ones. Finally, Figure IV-l(c)
indicates a replacement at a steady rate compatible with the
zero growth rate. After 14 years, the age distribution will
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be flat with 7% of the fleet in each age group.
Using average age as an indicator of the investment
policy reveals additional information. Figure IV-2 shows the
same three cases. Option (a) forms an upper bound with the
average age increasing at one year per year. This is clearly
not an acceptable long term solution as will be examined
later. Option (b) results in a continuing cyclic investment
and average age. Finally,. option (c) represents at least one
transitional mode which results in a stable average age
and a smooth investment.
With these three cases as a base, the model can be
used to examine the financial performance for these same
strategies. It is worth quickly reviewing the situation of
the model airline as presented in Chapter III. Figure IV-3
shows the after tax earnings and cash flow for years zero to
eight to the same scale which will be used throughout the
rest of this analysis. As shown, the earnings drop sharply
and then recover. The high negative cash flows associated
with the large investment (corresponding to the 1966-1968
airline investment) cease and cash flow becomes positive
as investment ceases. Fiaally, as shown in Figure IV-4,
the constant dollar net book value per RTM (CNBV/RTM) peaks
and then starts to declinierapidly.
Let us first examine the option of doing nothing at
all. This option assumes that the airline would, over
-55-
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time, convert its asset base to cash. As noted earlier, this
cash earns interest at a rate typical of "risk free" govern-
ment securities and is not invested in other projects. As
shown in Figure IV-5, earnings continue their rapid rise as
debt is lowered and interest charges are decreased. In
year 13 there is a drop as accumulated ITC runs out and the
effective tax rate rises from 24% to 48%. The next rise in
earnings is fueled by the declining depreciation charge
which goes to zero in year 18. From here on, earnings decline
to the fully taxed return from cash assets. Cash flow is
very strong at first but shows a significant drop as ITC
and loss carryforward from the rapid write off of flight
equipment expire. From year 12 on, actual tax paid markedly
exceeds the book tax as previously accumulated deferred tax
must be paid. The net result is a positive but declining
cash flow.
The "do-nothing" alternative is really a bench mark
from which to judge other options. It is a viable option
only in the last resort when no other solution exist. It
should also be noted that while earnings are still rising
(mostly from declining depreciation charges) the investment
base is rapidly decreasing. This results in a rate of return
well in excess of CAB standards thus presenting the illusion
of high return and possible adverse fare action when in fact
margins are falling.
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Viewed from today's perspective (approximately
year 9), the first few years of this option are very attrac-
tive. Rising earnings and cash flow can not help but be
exciting to an industry which has suffered from low earnings
and/or losses in recent years. It is the long term implica-
tion of going out of business which make the option of doing
nothing unattractive! It is tempting to delay purchases
during the initial years with the intention of doing something
later. This leads to the concept of delay until replacement
is required.
The second option is to begin replacement of
old equipment as it reaches a given age. One convenient age
would be 14 years when book depreciation is complete. (The
results are essentially the same if longer periods are
chosen.) Figure IV-6 presents the earning and cash flow
projection for this option. The impact of previous investment
patterns is very clear. The earnings closely parallel the
"do-nothing" case until the combination of higher depreciation
and interest charges from the new investment peak (year 17)
dominate and earnings crash.
The other part of the story, cash flow, shows the
same substantial impact (Figure IV-6(b)). Net cash flow (cash
from operations plus proceeds on sold aircraft and less tax
payments, interest and new investment) is highly cyclical.
Heavy cash drains are followed by high cash inflows. Whether
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an airline can finance such demands and effectively use the
substantial excesses is an important consideration. To
assume that the high cash inflows in years 19-25 can be safely
invested in assets liquid enough to supply the next round of
purchases is questionable.
The impact on earnings is very significant in terms
of investment strategies and thus deserves careful analysis.
Figure IV-7 shows the build up of charges against income
from operations. As can be seen, the cyclic character of the
depreciation charges builds the cyclic investment pattern
directly into reported earnings. As shown in Chapter II,
inflation is the primary factor in the fluctuations in depre-
ciation.
The impact of the inflation rate on earnings is
significant. Figure IV-8(a) shows the earnings before inter-
est and taxes (EBIT) for a fourteen year replacement cycle as
a function of the inflation rate (5% inflation is the base
case). Since earnings from operations are assumed to be
steadily increasing 'at the inflation rate, , the cyclic nature
of EBIT is the result of the variations in depreciation.
Reflected into after tax earnings, (Figurn IV-8(b)) the effect
of cyclic investment and high inflation is dramatic. It
should be noted that without inflation, earnings are relativ-
ely stable and acceptable considering that growth rate is zero.
The fluctuations in cash flow are also reflected in
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the capital structure of the airline. Figure IV-9 shows the
highly cyclic nature imposed by the assumption of cash needs
being met from debt financing. One possible alternative is
to stabilize the capital structure at 50% equity by the sale
and repurchase of stock as required. Figure IV-10 shows the
stock variation required and the resulting capital structure.
While this may appear to be more sound, the impact on earnings
is only minor (Figure IV-ll) and the impact on earnings per
share is tremendous. It is clear that changing the source of
required funds does not relieve the more basic cyclic behavior
imposed by the investment strategy.
In summary, the second option of replacing old
flight equipment as it reaches a given age, has several
problems. The fleet age structure imposed by historical ac-
tions is repeated in new equipment purchases. In the presence
of inflation, this leads to cyclic variation in depreciation
and thus in EBIT. These fluctuations are in turn amplified
by the debt service which peaks at the same time. Together,
interest and depreciation exert a heavy pressure on earnings
so that cyclic investment patterns impose a cyclic character
on earnings.
The third option is to invest at a rate consistent
with the growth rate. In this case, assuming a fourteen year
life, just over 7% (1/14) of the fleet would be replaced
every year. This approach to investment strategy results in
-66-
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a much smoother earnings and cash flow projection (Figure IV-
12) than the Case Ii strategy of replacement at a fixed life
since it surpresses the historical pattern. However, there
is still more variation than desired during the transition
phase. (After year 26, the fleet is completely uniform.)
A fourth strategy is to invest to smooth average age
or constant dollar net book value per RTM. As shown in
Figure IV-13 a further smoothing of earnings. and more partic-
ularly cash flow is achieved. Looking at the build up of
charges against earnings from operations (Figure IV-14) high-
lights the much smoother depreciation charge and the almost
constant interest payment. The capital structure also re-
flects the more stable pattern with the equity share growing
slowly as shown in Figure IV-15. It is also important to
note that, unlike the cyclic case where deferred tax remained
an almost constant 10%, here this "interest free" debt grows
from 15% to 26%. Another comparison between the cyclic
investment (Case II) and the stabilized investment (Case IV)
is shown in Figure IV-16. In the cyclic case, the asset base
is depleted and then massively built up to be depleted again
while the smoothe investment case results in little variation
in CNBV/RTM.
Both the capital structure and the CBNV/RTM call to
mind the differences noted earlier between United/American
and Delta. Delta has a much higher proportion of capital from
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equity and deferred tax. In addition, the CNBV/RTM for
Delta has been relatively more stable.
The other main analysis tool is discounted cash
flow. Figure IV-17(a) shows the DCF net present value (NPV)
as a function of discount rate. This data is from the per-
speetive of year 9. As showa, Case I (do-nothing) has the
highest NPV at discount rates above 8% and Case IV (smoothed
investment) is higher than Case II (cyclic investment) up to
21%. However, if future cash flows are viewed from year 18,
an entirely different picture is presented (Figure IV-17(b)).
Now, Case II has the highest NPV and Case I the lowest. Since
the goal of the analysis is an optimum investment pattern,
rather than a single investment, the decision should be valid
at any point in time.
In order to examine an investment strategy properly,
it is advantageous to see how the NPV varies with time.
Figure IV-18 presents the same three cases at two discount
rates. This presentation helps considerably in the analysis.
of the various options. Case I (do-nothing) shows the highest
initial NPV but steadily declines as the asset base is deple-
ted. The decline is at a compounded rate of better than 8%
which, coupled with a 5% inflation represents a significant
drop in real terms. The cyclic nature of the Case II cash
flows becomes evident when plotted as a function of time.
Finally, the steady rise of the Case IV (smooth investment)
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NPV (8% compounded rate) is apparent. If it were possible
to jump from one strategy to another, the best of all worlds
might be obtained. However, investments are required in
some specific pattern over time. Thus, it is impossible to
move from a zero investment strategy (Case I) to the smoothed
investment of Case IV in year 12 without having made the
investments in years 9, 10, and 11.
Based on the earnings data, cash flows and DCF,
there appear to be strong financial advantages to a smooth
investment policy. As is typical in any endeavor, trades
must be made to achieve the best ovarall performance. The
high profits and cash flows in the near term make the "do-
nothing" case attractive but the penalty in later years is
too severe. A smoothed earnings and cash flow picture comes
at the expense of some peak profits but avoids the pressure
on earnings after heavy investment.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
While it is always dangerous to generalize from
specific cases and examples, there appear to be certain
conclusions which can be drawn from the analysis presented
here for the low growth airline.
1. In periods of inflation and with current
historic cost accounting, a cyclic invest-
ment pattern will produce cyclic reported
earnings. The amplitude of the fluctuations
in earnings will be the result of the amplitude
of the investment cycle and the rate of
inflation. For double-digit inflation rates
which have been experienced recently, the
amplitude can easily be from substantial
loss to "excessive" profit. Some form of
replacement cost accounting would eliminate
this "structural" problem which results in
cyclic earning. Baring a change in accounting
conventions, there is strong motivation to
smooth earnings through a smooth investment
pattern.
2. A second major problem with a cyclic investment
pattern is that it produces cyclic cash flows.
Thus, there are periods of high positive cash
flow during times of low investment and high
negative cash flows during peak investment per-
iods. While the accumulated cash flow may be
positive (even on a discounted basis) there. are
significant problems presented. During periods of
cash inflow, investments must be made which both
hedge against inflation and which are liquid
enough to provide a cash source for the next peak
capital investment. This process makes an optimum
capital structure almost impossible to maintain.
3. Discounted cash flow (DCF) while giving a proper
answer for a single point investment, must be
examined as a function of time when evaluating
competing investment strategies. A cyclic in-
vestment pattern will produce a cyclic DCF as a
function of time. The net present value will
be high just after a major investment has been
made and low just before the next major investment.
4. Several indicators of investment performance
are available. The simplest relate to fleet
age and age distribution. A more valid measure
appears to be the constant dollar net book
value per revenue ton mile. This measure of
real investment per unit traffic should remain
relatively stable if investment is being made
in line with traffic growth and a stable
replacement policy is being maintained.
When the airline industry reaches maturity the key
financial factors shift from the source of funds for expansion
to optimizing financial performance. With inflation as a
"fact of life" there is a strong motivation to establish an
orderly turnover of capital assets. The optimum investment
turnover rate will depend on the tax structure, growth rate,
and general profitability of the airline. However, the air-
lines need to achieve the steady turnover of investment and
still maintain the capability to adjust to demand. This may
well result in orders placed at a steady rate with adjust-
ments in sales of used equipment to balance demand.
The future presents the airlines with many oppor-
tunities and many problems. While much of the "silk scarf"
glamour is gone, the real business of dealing with operating
costs, market share, regulatory activity, financial control,
etc. remain. The proper investment strategy can contribute
substantially to overall financial performance of the airline.
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APPENDIX A
AIRLINE FINANCIAL MODEL
The airline model is described is Chapter III.
This appendix presents the documentation of the program
its major features.
The program, named "Airline Pro Forma" is written
in BASIC and was executed on the Sloan School PRIME computer.
"Airline Pro Forma" is an interactive program with the
operator making the following decisions:
1. Starting RTM
2. Starting long term debt
3. Starting equity
4. Number of years to run
5. Real investment for each year
6. Stock sold in each year
7. Future inflation rate
8. Future growth rate
9. Historic inflation rate
10. Historic growth rate
Additional years can be run by specifying the following:
1. Number of additional years
2. Inflation rate
3. Growth rate
The following pages contain a list of variables and a
program listing.
-84-
List of Variables
z
A(z+2)
A(z+28)
B (z+2)
C (z+2)
D(z+2)
E (z+2)
F(z+2)
H (z+2)
I (z+23)
J(z+2)
K(z+2)
L(z+23)
M(z+2)
0 (z+2)
P (z+2)
Q (z+2)
R(z+2)
S(z+2)
T (z+2)
U (z+2)
V(z+2)
W(z+2)
year
average age
record of actual investment
double declining balance depreciation
total equity
debt
capital stock sold
accumulated straight line depreciation
accumulated ITC (tax books)
real investment
accumulated ITC (financial books)
tax paid (tax books)
actual investment
total actual investment
cash from operations
earnings
oldest airplane in fleet
revenue ton miles, total real investment
straight line depreciation
tax paid (financial books)
accumulated deferred tax
accumulated tax loss carryforward
cash flow
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X(z+2) inflation deflator
Y(z+2) dividend
Gi historical growth rate
G2 future growth rate
G3 historical inflation rate
Zl future inflation rate
"- I Re.L.IrE FF0P FORFMl
REN AIRLINE PRO FORMA
10 PRIN' AIRLINE PRO FORMA'
20 PRINT
30 PRINT 'HOW MANY YEARS' :
31 INPUT 22
32 IF Z2K2C2 THEN 40
33 Z2=32
40 LET G5"1
41 LET 72=0
50 DIM A?75)
51 DIM B75)
52 DIM C(75)
53 DIM D(75)
54 DIM E'275)
55 DIM F(C65)
56 D111 H(40)
57 DIM I(60)
58 DIM J(35)
59 DIM K(35)
60 DIM L(60)
61 DIM M(35)
62 DIM 0(35)
63 DIM P(35)
64 DIM Q(35)
65 DIM R(35)
66 DIM S(35)
67 'DIM T(25)
68 DIM U(35)
69 DIM Ve(:35)
70 DIM W(75)
71 DIM X(60)
72 DIM Y(35)
80 PRINT
85 PR.NT ' INPUT INITIAL YEAR CONDITIONS'
86 PRINT
87 PRY NT 'REVENUE TON MILES':
88 INPUT R(2)
94 PRINT
95 PRINT 'LONG TERM DEBT':
96 INPUT D(2)
97 PRINT
98 PRINT 'TOTAL EQUITY':
99 INPUT C(2)
100 IF G5>0 THEN 110
101 LET Z23=Z2
102 PRINT
103 PRINT 'HOW MANY MORE YEARS':
104 INPUT Z4
105 IF (Z4+Z3)<=32 THEN 109
106 Z4=32-Z23
109 Z2=Z4+Z3
110 PRINT
11 PRINT 'REAL INVESTMENT FOR NEXT':(Z2-Z3):'YEARS'
:I Rm -q 06-.
I1Fe.LZ.r*"-E--F=>IFZLI3E FR0 FR i
115
116
il.7
119
120
125
126
127
128
129
130
134
135
136
140
141.
142
145
146
147
50
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
58
159
60
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
i68
170
7
1.72
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
86
8
182
PRINT
FOR G9=23+1 TO 22
PRINT G9:
INPUT I(G9+23)
NEXT G9
PRINT
PRINT 'CAPITAL STOCK SOLD':
PRINT
FOR G4=23+1 TO 22
PRINT G4:
INPUT E(G4+2)
NEXT G4
PRINT
PRINT 'FUTURE INFLATION RATE':
INPUT 21
PRINT
PRY NT 'FUTURE GROWTH RATE':
INPUT G2
IF G5>6 THEN 150
LET 22=22+1
GOTO 185
PRINT
PRINT 'HISTORICAL INFLATION RATE':
INPUT G3
XC23)=1
FOR N7=1 TO 21
XC 23-N7)=X(24-N7)*ci+G3)
NEXT N7
PRINT
PRINT 'HISTORICAL GROWTH RATE':
INPUT Gi
LET F( )=0
LET JCI)=0
LET H :)=0
LET VC )=0
UCI)=200
FOR G=0 TO 13
G=G+1/(1+G)^G
NEXT G
IC23)=R(2)/G0
LET R( )=R(2)/( +G2)
FOR G8=0 TO 13
LET G7= (68+. 5)? C (1+63)*C1+G1) >^G
LET F(2)=F(2)+G7*IC23)/14
NEXT G8
F (40>=1
FOR N7=1 TO 20
FCN7+40)=wFCN7+39)-F(40)18
IF F(N7+40)<=0 THEN 180
NEXT N7
FOR G=0 TO 14
LET I(23-G)=I(23)/i+G )^G
LET LC23-G)=I(23-G)/(I+G3)YG
1. F;:!E-=I1l- 007 -
P E -38- u AI Rt..I NE F=PO rF=M
184 NEXT G
185 FOR 2=23 TO 22
186 M(Z+2)=0
187 29=0
188 27=0
89 C(Z+40)=0
190 A(Z+2)=0
191 RC2+2)=R(Z+)*( +G2)
192 L(Z+23)=I(Z+23)*((+Z:)Z)
193 A(2+40)=LCZ+23)
194 20=0
195 LET 25=R(Z+2)
196 FOR 26=0 TO 22
197 LET 28=I(Z+23-b6)
198 IF Z=0 THEN 200
199 X(2+23)=Xz2+22>/Ci+21)
200 25=R(Z+2)
201 FOR 26=0 TO 22
202 28=I1Z+23-Z6)
203 IF 27>0 THEN 212
204 Z5=25-28
205 IF 25<=0 THEN 206
206 IF 26>=20 THEN 1625
207 NEXT 26
208 LET N5=L(Z+23-Z6)
209 LET I(Z+23-26)=Z8+Z5
210 LET LCZ+23-Z6)=N5*ICZ+23-26)/Z8
211 GOTO 215
212 LET N5=L(2+23-Z6)
213 LET I(Z+23-26)=0
214 LET L(Z+23-26)=0
215 IF Z6>14 THEN 222
216 29=Z9+(N5-L(Z+23-26))*Z6/14
217 CC2+40)=CZ+40)+(N5-L(Z+23-Z6))*(14-26)/ 4
218 ECZ+40)=E(Z+40)+(N5-L(Z+23-26))*F(40+Z6)*X(Z+23-26)/X(Z+23)
219 20=ZO+N5-L(Z+23-Z6)
220 27=1
221 NEXT 26
222 29=29+N5-LCZ+23-26)
223 E(?+40)=E(Z+40)+(N5-L(Z+23-Z6))*F(40+Z6)*X(2+23-Z6>/X(Z+23)
224 27=1
225 NEXT 26
240 FOR N9=3 TO 23
242 LET H(Z+2)=A(Z+2)+(I(Z+N9)*(23.5-N9)>
243 LET M(Z+2)=M(Z+2)+L(Z+N9)
244 NEXT N9
245 LET A(Z+2)=A(Z+2)/R(Z+2)
250 IF Z>0 THEN 260
251 S(2)=M(2)/14-L(23)/28+I(23)/(((C+G)*CI+G3)>Y14)*28)
252 GOTO 270
260 S Z+2)=L(Z+23)/28+L(Z+9)/28+Z0/28
261 FOR G6=0 TO 12
262 SCZ+2)=S(Z+2)+LCZ+22-06>/14
11 X ERL.89 flE FoL7KNE Fro o=inM
263 NEXT G6
270 LEl CZ+2)=.143*LCZ+23)+.245*L(Z+22)+.175*L(Z+21)
271 LET B(Z+2)=BCZ+2)+.125*LZ+20)+9.6E-02*LCZ+19)+8.7E-02*LCZ+18)
272 LET B(Z+2)=B(Z+2)+8.6E-02*LCZ+17)+4.3E-02*L(Z+16)
275 IF Z=0 THEN 300
280 LET FCZ+2)=F(Z+ )+S(Z+2)-Z9
300 N9=I(7+8)+2*I(Z+7)+3*ICZ+6)+4*I(Z+5)+5*ICZ+4)+6*ICZ+3)
301 O(Z+2)=C9E-02*(R(Z+2)-N9/7))/X(Z+22)
311 IF Z>0 THEN 315
312 GOTO 317
35 DCZ+2)rCD(Z+ )-D(Z+39)+YCZ+ )-O(Z+ )+K(Z+ )+B(Z+39)
316 DCZ+2)=DCZ+2)+CL(Z+23)+L(Z+22)-E(Z+40)-EcZ+39))/2-ECZ+2)
317 IF DCZ+2)>0 THEN 320
318 DCZ+40)=0-DCZ+2)
319 DCZ+2)=0
320 IF Z>0 THEN 324
321 6C40)=9E-02*D(2)-7E-02*D(40)
323 GOTO 325
324 6B(+40)=9E-02*DCZ+2)-7E-02*DCZ+40)
325 N=COC+2)-SaZ+2)-BCZ+40+EaZ+40-CcZ+40on*.48
326 IF N>0 THEN 340
327 TCZ+2)=N
328 JCZ+2>=JCZ+ )+(CC+2)*7E-02)
329 GOTO 369
340 LET N =(BCZ+2)*7E-02)+JCZ+)-N*. 5
350 IF N >0 THEN 360
351 LET TCZ+2)=N-<BCZ+2>*7E-02+J Z+ ))
352 LET JCZ+2)=0
353 GOTO 369
360 LET TC7+2)=N*.5
361 LET JCZ+2)=JCZ+ )+CBCZ+2)*7E-C2)-N*.5
369 N3=COCZ+2)-BCZ+2)-BCZ+40)+ECZ+40n>*.48
370 IF N3<0 THEN 390
37 LET N2=B(Z+2)*7E-02+HCZ+ )-N3*.5
372 IF N2>0 THEN 380
373 LET KCZ+2)=N3-BCZ+2)*7E-02-H<+1)
374 LET KCZ+2)=KCZ+2)-VCZ+ )
375 IF KCZ+2)>0 THEN 397
376 LET KCZ+2>=0
377 LET VCZ+2)=VCZ+ )-N3-BCZ+2)*7E-02-HcZ+ )
378 LET HC7+2)=0
379 GOTO 400
380 LET KCZ+2)=N3*.5
381 LET KCZ+2)=KCZ+2)-VCZ+ )
382 IF KC(Z+2)>0 THEN 394
383 LET KCZ+2)=0
384 LET VCZ+2)V(Z+ )-N3*.5
381 LET H(Z+2)=H<Z+ >+BCZ+2)*7E-02-N3*.5
- 386 GOTO 400
390 LET KCZ+2)=0
391 LET VCZ+2>=V<Z+ >-N3
392 LET HCZ+2)=HCZ+I)+7E-02*B(Z+2)
393 GOTO 400
. REO M -c9 -
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394 LET HCZ+2)=HCZ+ )+7E-02*BCZ+2)-. 5*N3
395 LET V(Z+2)=O
396 GOTO 400
397 LET VCZ+2)=0
398 LET HCZ+2)=0
400 FOR N4=0 TO 21
401 IF ICZ+2+N4)>0 THEN 403
402 NEXT N4
403 LET QCZ+2)=2 .5-N4
410 P(Z+2)=O(Z+2>-SZ+2)-BCZ+40)-TZ+2)+E(Z+40)-CZ+40)
420 LET WCZ+2)=P(Z+2)+T(Z+2)-KCZ+2)+SCZ+2)
430 LET UCZ+2)=U(Z+i)+TCZ+2)-KCZ+2)
440 LET YCZ+2)=.5*P(Z+2)
441 IF YCZ+2)>0 THEN 443
442 LET YCZ+2)=0
443 IF Z=0 THEN 445
444 LET C(Z+2)=CCZ+ )+ECZ+2)+PCZ+2)-YCZ+2)
445 WCZ+40):=OZ+2)+E(Z+40)-KCZ+2>-BCZ+40)-L(Z+23>
450 NEXT Z
451 IF G5>0 THEN 460
452 LET Z3=Z3-1
460 PRINT
470 PRINI 'BASIC DATA-1; TAX DATA-2; TAX RATE-3; CASH FLOW-4;'
471. PRINT 'FLEET DATA-5; DEPRECIATION-6; DEBT STRUCTURE-7;'
472 PRINT 'ALL OF THE ABOVE-8; ENOUGH ALREADY-9;'
474 PRINT 'WHAT DATA':
475 INPUT N8
476 IF N8=2 THEN 600
477 IF N8=3 THEN 650
478 IF N8=4 THEN 700
479 IF N8=5 THEN 800
480 IF NB=6 THEN 900
481 IF N8=7 THEN 1000
482 IF NB=9 THEN 1600
483 PRINT
484 PRINT
485 PRINT ' BASIC DATA'
486 PRINT
487 PRINW 'YEAR', 'EARNINGS',s'ROI', 'CASH FLOW' 'INVESTMENT'
488 PRINT
489 IF 05=0 THEN 494
490 PRINT Z3,P(2),P<2)/C. 5*R(2)+MC2)-F2)+DC40)),W(2),A<40>
491 PRINT
494 FOR N7=Z3+1 TO Z2
495 NO=. 15*RCN7+2)+MCN7+2>-F CN7+2)+D(N7+40)
496 PRINT N7,1 PCN7+2), PCN7+2)/NO1 WCN7+2), A(N7+40)
497 PRINT
498 NEXT N7
499 IF N8=8 THEN 600
500 GOTO 474
600 PRINT
601 PRINT
602 PRINT ' TAX DATA'
FzerEM -90-.
eIMLINE =t ronM
603 PRINT
610 PRINT 'YEAR','TAX PAID', 'DEF. TAX','ACC. ITC',-'LOSS CF'
611 PRINT
615 IF G5=0 THEN 620
616 PRINT Z3,K(2), T(2)-KC2), H(2)V<2)
617 PRINT
620 FOR N7=Z3+1 TO Z2
625 PRIM N7,K(N7+2), TCN7+2>-KCN7+2),H(N7+2)>V<N7+2)
626 PRINT
630 NEXT N7
640 IF N8=8 THEN 650
645 GOTO 474
650 PRINT
651 PRINT
652 PRINT ' TAX RATES'
653 PRINT
660 PRINT 'YEAR',-'BOOK RATE','ACTUAL RATE'
661 PRINT
665 IF G5=0 THEN 670
666 N9=TC2X/(0C2)-S(2)-B(40)+E(40)-CC40))
667 PRINT 3,PN9,K(2)/C0C2)-BC2)-BC40)+E(40))
668 PRINT
670 FOR N7=Z3+1 TO Z2
672 N5=&CN7+2)/COCN7+2)-SCN7+2)-BCN7+40>+ECN7+40>-CCN7+40))
673 N9=K(N7+2)/(CON7+2)-B(N7+2.-BCN7+40)+ECN7+40))
675 PRINT N7, N5, N9
676 PRINT
680 NEXT N7
690 IF N8=8 THEN 700
695 GOTO 474
700 PRINT
701 PRINT
702 PRINT ' CASH FLOW'
703 PRINT
710 PRINT 'YEAR', 'CASH OPS','A/P SALES', 'DIVIDEND'3 'NET C.F.-
711 PRINT
715 IF G5=0 THEN 720
717 PRINT Z3, O(2). EC40), YC2),WC40)
718 PRINT
720 FOR N7=Z3+ TO Z2
725 PRINT N7?,O(N7+2), E(N7+40>, Y<N7+2)>,WCN7+40>
726 PRINT
730 NEXT N7
734 PRINT
735 PRIN'r 'DISCOUNT CASH FLOW TO WHAT BASE YEAR':
736 INPUT N7
743 PRINT
745 PRINT 'DISCOUNT RATE'3 ' NPV"
746 PRINT
747 FOR N6=0 TO .5 STEP 5E-02
748 LET N9=0
749 FOR N5=N7 TO Z2-
750 N9=N9+W(N540)/CC +N6)^CN5-N7))
:I.. fREf -91-
- Fr-1 -92- FiIRLINE FeC oFrerF
751 NEXT N5
752 FOR N5=1 TO 21
?53 N9=N9+CI CZ2+N5+2)+C 61-N5) /X CZ2+23))/CC +N6)^(Z2-N7))
760 NEXT N5
770 PRINT
780 PRINT N6, N9
781 NEXT N6
782 PRINT
783 PR)NT 'DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW AGAIN-1; CONTINUE-O':
784 INPUT N7
785 IF N7=1 THEN 734
786 IF N8=8 THEN 800
790 GOTO 474
800 PRINT
801 PRINT
8A2 PRINT' FLEET DATA'
803 PRINT
8S0 PR3NT 'YEAR','AVERAGE AGE','OLDEST A/P', 'RTM', 'CBV/RTM'
811 PRINT
815 IF G5=0 THEN 820
8*16 PRIP1 73.. A(2), QC2), RC2), CMC2)-FC2))*XC23)/R(2)
817 PRINT
820 FOR N7=Z23+1 TO 22
825 PRINT N'7 AC N7+2),QCN7+2),RCN7+2), (MCN7+2)-FC N7+2))*XCN7+23)/RCN7+2)
826 PRINT
830 NEXT N7
840 IF N8=8 THEN 900
850 GOTO 474
900 PRINT
901 PRINT
902 PRINT ' DEPRECIATION'
903 PRINT
910 PRINT 'YEAR','S.L. DEP,'ACC. DEP','BOOK VALUE','DDB DEP'
911 PRINT
915 IF G5=0 THEN 920
916 PRINT 23,SC2)1,FC2),MC2)-F (2),B(2)
917 PRINT
920 FOR N7=Z3+1 TO Z2
9215 PRINi N7,SCN7+2),F(N7+2)1,MCN7+2>-FCN7+2),BCN7+2)
926 PRINT
930 NEXT N7
940 IF N8=8 THEN 1000
950 GOTO 474
1000 PRINT
1001 PRINT
1002 PRINT ' DEBT STRUCTURE'
1003 PRINT
10 0 PRINT 'YEAR','DEBT','SECURITIES','ACC DEF TAX'S 'DEBT-EQUITY'
4.011 PRINT
1015 IF G5=0 THEN 1020
1016 PRINT Z3,DC2). DC40;,UC2), CDC2)+UC2))/(DC2)+UC2)+CC2))
1017 PRINT
1020 FOR N7=Z3+1 TO 22
-3. R:ErI -93- fIRL. IJE FRZ FrFP1
01 N5= I)(N7+2)+ UN7+2) / C D CN7+2)+U CN7+2)+C CN7+2) )
1025 PRINT N7.:CNT+2)..cc7+40).. Uc N7+2)x..sN5
1026 PRINT
102 NE>T N7
1046 IF NS=8 THEN j6i3
1050 GOTO 474
1600 PRINT
1601 PRINT
1602 PR I NT 'ENOUGH ALREADY
1602 PRINT
:1604 PRTNT 'MORE YEARS-1; STOP-P'v:
1600 INPUT N6
1606 IF N6"0 THEN 1999
1620 LET G5=8
1621 GOTO 101
162 I(2+27*:=I C2+23)+2-
16fl PRINT
:1631 PR Itil 'YEAR : 2: ' INVESTMENT REVISED TO' : I c Z+23)
1640 GOTO 186
1999 PR INT 'THANK GOD!
2006 END
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Referring to the program listing, the following
major sections can be identified:
lines 10 - 159 variable scaling and input
lines 160 - 184 establish initial conditions
lines 185 - 319 calculation of depreciation
lines 320 - 398 calculation of taxes
lines 400 - 450 earning and cash flow
lines 451 - 1050 print options
lines 1600 - 2000 exit and corrections
All calculations in the program are done in a
step by step fashion, completing one year and then increment-
ing to the next year.
